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Articles
Heikki Marjosola
What Role for Courts in Protecting Investors
in Europe – A View from Finland
Abstract: Using Finnish case law on complex financial products as an example,
this paper deals with the question of what role national courts could, and indeed
should, have in the future disputes between investment firms and their clients,
given that their private law relationship is embedded in an increasingly self-
sufficient EU rulebook. Will there be room for principles deriving from national
private law, or could the courts take a more active role in interpreting principles
deriving from the MiFID itself? The paper argues that national courts should
complement the ‘administrative paradigm’ of the European Union’s financial
services law, enhanced by the new MiFID regime, with a more principles-based
enforcement.
Résumé: Utilisant à titre d’exemple la jurisprudence finlandaise sur les produits
financiers complexes, cet article s’interroge sur le rôle des juridictions nationales
pourraient et devraient avoir dans le règlement des différends futurs entre les
sociétés d’investissement et leurs clients, étant donné que leur realtion de droit
privé prend place dans un ensemble autonomisé de règles de l’Union européenne.
Y aura-t-il de la place pour des principes provenant du droit privé national, ou les
juridictions pourraient-elles jouer un rôle plus important dans l’interprétation des
principes du MiFid? Cette contribution fait valoir que ces juridictions devraient
compléter le paradigme administratif du droit des services financiers de l’Union
européenne, amélioré par le nouveau régime Mifid, selon un régime plus systéma-
tique.
Zusammenfassung: Vor dem Hintergrund von finnischem Fallrecht zu komple-
xen Finanzprodukten widmet sich der Beitrag der Frage, welche Rolle Gerichte im
Streit zwischen Anlegern und Finanzdienstleistern spielen sollten – dies nament-
lich vor dem Hintergrund, dass die privatrechtliche Beziehung eingebettet ist in
ein sich zunehmend autark entwickelndes EU Rulebook. Lässt dies überhaupt
Raum für ein autonom sich entwickelndes nationales Privatrecht, oder könnten
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Gerichte eine aktivere Rolle spielen bei der Entwicklung von Prinzipien, die sich
aus der MIFID selbst ableiten lassen? Der Beitrag argumentiert, Gerichte sollten in
der Tat ein Gegengewicht zum „Verwaltungsparadigma“ im Europäischen Fi-
nanzrecht bilden und dieses „komplementieren“ –wobei das neue MIFID-Regime
mit einer stärker prinzipienbasierten Durchsetzungsphilosophie dem entgegen-
kommen könnte.
DOI 10.1515/ercl-2014-0024
1 Introduction
Questions of securities law enforcement are timely. While retail investor protec-
tion is arguably a peacetime preoccupation of regulators,1 its effectiveness is
brought to a serious test only in times of crises. The fall of Lehman Brothers
investment bank and the systemic effects it triggered globally caused, both
directly and indirectly, losses for countless investors. Not surprisingly, abundant
litigation ensued, with claimants ranging from non-professional retail investors
and small or medium-sized businesses to public bodies such as municipalities.2
This aftermath has partly lead EU legislator to rethink the level, scope and nature
of available investor protection in the single market. In June 2014 the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)3 was repealed by a new directive (MiFID
II) and regulation (MiFIR).4 The new package also updates many key investor
protection provisions, but above all signals increasing Union activity with regard
to supervision and enforcement of rules.
However, by emphasising public enforcement and providing for minimum
harmonisation of national administrative sanctions regimes (see next section),
the new MiFID regime has a strikingly public law character while the role of
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1 N. Moloney, ‘Regulating the retail markets: law, policy, and the financial crisis’ (2010) 63
Current legal problems 375–447, 376.
2 For a succinct review of case law, see E. Wymeersch, ‘Regulation and Case Law Relating to
Financial Derivatives’University of Ghent Financial Law InstituteWorking Paper 2012–03 (2012).
3 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on
markets in financial instruments,OJEC 2004 L 145/14.
4 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets
in financial instruments, OJEU 2014 L 173/349 (MiFID II); Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 onmarkets in financial instruments,OJEU
2014 L 173/ 84 (MiFIR).
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private enforcement has been overlooked.5 This shift, while welcome in many
respects from the perspective effective supervision, exacerbates the public-private
asymmetry of the EU investment services law and leaves many private law
questions unanswered.6 The MiFID’s private law effects, especially in civil liabili-
ty context, remain its biggest blind spots.7 For instance, it is not entirely clear to
what extent civil courts can be stricter than MiFID in application of their private
law principles and standards.8 What is clear, however, is that the private law
outcome of a breach of the MiFID-based rules continues to be dictated primarily
by national law. This principle was underlined in the recent Bankinter case,9
which was also the first CJEU case dealing with the MiFID’s key investor protec-
tion provisions.10 The Court confirmed that, subject to observance of the princi-
ples of equivalence and effectiveness, it is for the internal legal order of each
Member State to determine the contractual consequences in the event that an
investment service provider failed to comply with the MiFID’s requirements.11
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5 N. Moloney, ‘Liability of Asset Managers: A Comment’ (2012) 7 Capital Markets Law Journal 414,
416.
6 This is not to deny the MiFID’s particular private law character. MiFID’s rules of conduct as
regulatory law indeed have a public law nature but they are transformed into contractual
standards in the everyday relationships between intermediaries and their clients. See G. Ferrarini,
‘Contract standards and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID): An assessment of
the Lamfalussy regulatory architecture’ (2005) 1 European Review of Contract Law 19. This could
be perceived as reducing the scope of traditional contract law but it can also be symptomatic of
the way European regulatory private law functions. For regulatory private law, party autonomy or
freedom of contract does not provide a starting point, but the law is rather designed for the
‘achieving, fostering or managing of particular markets or particular policy objectives.’ See eg
H.-W. Micklitz, ‘Administrative Enforcement of Private Law’, in R. Brownsword, H.-W. Micklitz,
L. Niglia and S. Weatherill (eds), Foundations of European Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2011).
7 See M. Tison, ‘The civil law effects of MiFID in a comparative law perspective’ University of
Ghent Financial Law Institute Working Paper WP 2010–05, 13 (2010). A question to what extent a
breach of the MiFID’s conduct of business rules could or should form the basis for liability is by no
means a new one. As noted by Tison (ibid, 2), this was debated already prior to the MiFID. See also
D. Busch, ‘Why MiFID matters to private law – the example of MiFID’s impact on an asset
manager’s civil liability’ (2012) 7 Capital Markets Law Journal 386.
8 European jurisdictions seem to have very different answers to these questions. See Busch, n 7
above, 394–398.
9 Case 604/11, Genil 48, S L and Comercial Hostelera de Grandes Vinos, S L v Bankinter S A and
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S A [2013] (CJEU) (not yet reported).
10 For an analysis of the case from private law perspective, see S. Grundmann, ‘The Bankinter
Case onMIFID Regulation and Contract Law’ (2013) 9 European Review of Contract Law 267.
11 Case 604/11, n 9 above, para 58.
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The question with which this article is concerned is what role the civil courts
will, or should, have in adjudicating future disputes between financial firms and
their clients, especially given that their legal relationship is increasingly dictated
by a thickening European rulebook. The article focuses on Finland as a case
study. In Finland, too, the financial crisis was followed by a significant increase
in private enforcement activity. However, in a large majority of the cases investors
chose to take their case to the Securities Complaints Board, an informal alterna-
tive dispute resolution scheme provided by the Finnish Financial Ombudsman.
Therefore, the Finnish conduct of business regime remains largely untested in
courts. Moreover, to the knowledge of the author, none of the cases initiated in
Finnish courts concerning complex financial products involve investments made
after the implementation of the MiFID in November 2007. However, the few
‘outlier’ cases, which ended up in courts instead of the Securities Complaints
Board, represent well the function that courts can play in filling regulatory
lacunae through enforcement of more value-charged legal principles.
The next section will underline the key changes brought about by the recently
updated MiFID regime. Section 3 presents briefly the statutory framework of the
Finnish system of investor protection, which is followed by examination of
Finnish case law. Two cases will be presented in more detail, both dealing with
complex financial instruments. One case was settled soon after the judgement of
the district court, while the other, at the time of writing, is pending before the
Supreme Court of Finland. In addition, two earlier Supreme Court decisions
address the so-called unit-linked insurance plans and as these cases also concern
alleged misselling of new financial products, they will be briefly touched upon.
Section 4 addresses the more normative argument of which role the courts should
play in protecting investors in Europe.
2 The updated MiFID Regime
The Investment Services Directive (ISD)12 harmonized little and its underlying
ideology was based on mutual recognition, free movement through ‘passporting’
of financial services, and home member state supervision. The ISD’s conduct of
business rules were framed in general terms, leaving substantial leeway for
national authorities to implement and refine them.13 The MiFID, on the other
548 Heikki Marjosola
12 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field,OJEC
1993 L 197.
13 The ISD required Member States to draw up rules of conduct implementing at least the list of
principles set out in the Directive. Member States were to make sure that investment firms observe
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hand, laid down an extensive conduct of business regime for investment firms,
which was developed further with an implementing directive14 as well as non-
binding recommendations and opinions issued by the Committee of European
Securities Regulators (since 2011, the European Securities Markets Authority,
ESMA). Article 19 of the MiFID restates the general principle that investment firms
must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests
of its clients when providing investment services,15 but it also laid down a more
extensive conduct of business framework, operationalizing the general duty of
care principle into several informational and other duties.16 In addition, the scope
of protection was made dependent on a strict system of client classification.17
Together with the Implementing Directive 2006/73/EC, which provided more
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the rules of conduct at all times (Article 11(1)). See E. Wymeersch, ‘Private Law Remedies Relating
to Obligations Flowing from EU Directives on Securities’, in M. Rudanko and P. Timonen (eds),
European Financial Area (proceedings of closing seminar of the research project of KATTI).
Publications of the Helsinki University Institute of International Economic Law 31 (1996) 177–205,
194–196.
14 Commission Implementing Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 as regards organisational
requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of
that Directive, OJEU L 241/26. The other act implementing MiFID is the Commission Regulation
1287/EC/2006 of 10 August 2006 as regards record-keeping obligations for investment firms,
transaction reporting, market transparency, admission of financial instruments to trading, and
defined terms for the purposes of that Directive,OJEU L 241/1.
15 This ‘loyalty principle’ was included already in the ISD (art 11). On the background of MiFID’s
conduct of business principles, See O.O. Cherednychenko, ‘European Securities Regulation,
Private Law and the Investment Firm-Client Relationship’ (2009) 5 European Review of Private Law
925, 929–930.
16 The principles forming the core of the MiFID’s conduct of business regime, are laid down in
arts 19(2) to (8) and include, inter alia, the following: the duty to provide fair, clear and not
misleading information (art 19(2)); the duty to provide information in comprehensible form (eg
about the investment firm and its services and proposed investment strategies and financial
instruments, including appropriate guidance on and warnings of the risks associated with invest-
ments in those instruments) (art 19(3)); the duty to conduct a suitability test when providing
investment advice or portfolio management (ie obtain certain necessary information regarding
the client’s or potential client’s knowledge and experience in the investment field, his financial
situation and his investment objectives) (art 19(4)); the duty to conduct an appropriateness test
when providing other investment service than investment advice or portfolio management (art 19
(5)); the conditions for the provision on ‘execution only’ investment services (ie investment
services that only consist of execution and/or the reception and transmission of client orders
without the need to obtain the above stated information or the assessment of suitability or
appropriateness) (art 19(6)). Art 21 also sets an important duty for an investment service provider
to ensure ‘best execution’ of the client’s order.
17 See M. Kruithof, ‘A Differentiated Approach to Client Protection: The Example of MiFID’, in
S. Grundmann and Y.M. Atamer (eds), Financial Services, Financial Crisis and General European
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detail in the relatively flexible conduct provisions, the MiFID regime transformed
the EU investment services and markets regulation from minimum harmonisation
closer to maximum harmonisation.18
The new MiFID regime takes the development a step further. Echoing the
unification movement, the MiFID II recites the Union’s commitment to ‘minimise
discretions available to Member States across Union financial services law’.19 The
new framework, applicable starting January 2017, also entails updated organisa-
tional and conduct requirements. Noting the apparent shortcomings in the protec-
tions of ‘non-retail’ clients, the MiFID II regulation seeks to ‘better calibrate the
requirements applicable to different categories of clients.’20 The updated conduct
rules (Articles 24 and 25), try to make sure that intermediaries understand the
products they recommend or offer (Article 24(2)) and that they are suitable taking
into account the relevant client’s risk tolerance and ability to bear losses (Article
25(2)). The rules also tackle the so-called ‘independent’ investment advice: for an
investment advice to be independent, it must be based on an assessment of a
sufficient range of sufficiently diverse financial instruments and the advisor
cannot accept and retain fees, commissions or any monetary or non-monetary
benefits in relation to the provision of the service (Article 24(7)).21 Investment
firms’ internal remuneration or performance assessment practices must also not
conflict with their duty to act in the best interests of its clients (Article 24(10)).
As the above provisions demonstrate, the MiFID II signals a move away from
the process-based model of its predecessor towards a more consumer-focused,
interventionist approach. Protection of retail investors seems to have become a
part of the Union’s consumerisation agenda, and retail investors are now being
characterized, also with regard to types of protection measures available, more as
consumers of financial products and services.22 The MiFID II shrinks the autonomy
of retail investors also by curtailing the range of investment products eligible for
550 Heikki Marjosola
Contract Law: Failure and Challenges of Contracting (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International,
2011).
18 Basically, the notion of maximum harmonisation means limiting the Member States’ possibi-
lities to adopt measures that go beyond those adopted at EU level.
19 MiFID II, Rec 58. Art 24(12) of the Directive states that Member States may impose additional
requirements on investment firms, in respect of the matters covered by the Article, only in
exceptional cases and such requirements must be objectively justified and proportionate. This
approach was already used in the MiFID I regime, see eg Implementing Directive 2006/73/EC,
art 4.
20 Rec (104).
21 Restrictions on economic inducements also concern portfoliomanagers (art 24(8)).
22 N. Moloney, ‘The Investor Model Underlying the EU’s Investor Protection Regime: Consumers
or Investors?’ (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law Review 169, 172, suggesting that while
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the so-called execution-only sales (Article 25(4)) – the underlying rationale here is
probably to push more investors into an investment advice relationship.23 Perhaps
the farthest reaching example of interventionist approach is the extensive product
intervention powers given by the MiFIR to national supervisors and, as a last
resort, to ESMA (in the case of structured deposits to the European Banking
Authority). These powers, which are meant to address serious concerns regarding
investor protection, orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets, or
commodities markets, or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system,
allow the adoption of temporary prohibitions or restrictions in the Union on the
marketing, distribution or sale of certain financial instruments or types of finan-
cial activity or practice (Articles 40 to 42).24
Finally, it is particularly noteworthy that, in line with the majority of EU’s
post-crisis financial markets legislation, the MiFID II/MiFIR package contains
substantial amount of delegations of power to ESMA and the Commission to
further refine its provisions as well as to update them where necessary.25 In
practice this also means that much of previous soft law guidance will in the future
be served in a harder format.26
Beyond rules in books, the new MiFID regime seeks to enhance the effective-
ness of its more consumer-friendly provisions through enhanced supervisory and
enforcement powers on both EU and national level. The MiFID II introduces a
common minimum set of supervisory and investigative powers for national reg-
ulators, coupled with a minimum level of administrative measures and sanctions
for infringements.27 Notably, the Directive does not seek to harmonise the effects
it has on the Member States private law regimes with regard to assessment of civil
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pre-crisis EU investor protection policy was based on the retail investor, the consumer type now
seems to be the target of intervention.
23 For an early analysis, see Moloney, n 22 above, 179–180.
24 Such prohibitions or restrictions can be imposed on a precautionary basis before a financial
instrument or structured deposit has beenmarketed, distributed or sold to clients (eg art 39(2)(2)).
However, the powers ‘do not imply any requirement to introduce or apply a product approval or
licensing by the competent authority, ESMA or EBA.’ (MiFIR, Rec 29).
25 With regard to conduct of business rules, see the powers delegated to the Commission under
art 24(13) and art 25(8).
26 By way of an example, while CESR provided non-binding guidelines for investment firms to
distinguish between complex and non-complex financial instruments for the purposes of the
MiFID’s appropriateness requirements (3 November 2009, CESR/09-558) in the future the Com-
mission is expected to hand a delegated act to determine the same. However, art 25(11) of MiFID II
also states that ESMA may continue to develop guidelines for the assessment of financial instru-
ments being classified as non-complex, but it must take into account the delegated acts adopted
by the Commission.
27 MiFID II, arts 69 and 70.
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liability.28 This emphasis on public supervision and enforcement is symptomatic
of much of EU’s post-crisis reforms.29 Therefore, it is within the discretion of the
Member States to choose the appropriate methods of private enforcement, a
principle recently underlined also by the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU).30 The only exception is that the MiFID II, like its predecessor, promotes
the use extra-judicial mechanism for handling consumer complaints and for that
purpose requires Member States to set-up efficient and effective complaints and
redress procedures for the out-of-court settlement of disputes. These procedures
should not, however, prejudice the right to bring action before the courts.31
3 A view from Finland
3.1 Statutory context
The Finnish Investment Services Act (FI: Sijoituspalvelulaki 747/2012) lays down
the conduct of business regime regulating the relationship between investment
firms and their clients. In addition, the Finnish Securities Markets Act (FI: Arvopa-
perimarkkinalaki 746/2012) contains a general prohibition to give false or mislead-
ing information when marketing or acquiring securities (Chapter 1, Section 3) as
well as lays down a general principle according to which it is prohibited to act
contrary to ‘good practice in the securities markets.’ (Chapter 1, Section 2). In the
absence of clear norm, the content of good securities markets practice evolves
primarily in established market practices and industry self-regulation and it can
guide procedures and decisions especially in the cases when there is no concrete
rule available.32
Finnish law seems clear with respect to the consequences of non-compliance
with the Investment Services Act’s conduct of business rules. The general da-
mages clause was amended and specified in the new Investment Services Act,
552 Heikki Marjosola
28 Interestingly, the Commission originally flirted with the idea of introducing ʻa principle of civil
liability’ in the new MiFID: ‘Introducing a principle of civil liability of investment services
providers would be essential for ensuring an equal level of investor protection in the EU.’
European Commission, Public Consultation, Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID) 8 December 2010 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/
2010/mifid/ consultation_paper_en.pdf <accessed September 2013>, at 63.
29 Moloney, n 5 above, 420–421.
30 Case 604/11, Genil 48, S L and Comercial Hostelera de Grandes Vinos, S L v Bankinter S A and
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S A [2013] (CJEU) (not yet reported).
31 MiFIR, Rec 151.
32 Government Bill 32/2012, 96.
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which was introduced in the course of the 2011 overhaul of the Finnish financial
markets legislation. The damages provision in its present form states that anyone
who willfully or negligently causes damage to another person through conduct in
violation of the Investment Services Act, the provisions or regulations issued
thereunder or of the regulations or decisions of the European Commission issued
under the MiFID, shall be liable to compensate the loss caused (Chapter 16,
Section 1).33 The substantive scope of the damages clause is thus as broad as
possible. According to the Investment Services Act’s actes préparatoires, the
general damages rule covers liability stemming from both tort and breach of
contract, and also covers pure economic losses.34 The inclusion of pure economic
losses within the provision’s remit might seem redundant (for now, at least,
financial products hardly cause personal injuries or damage to property), but it
clarifies the special nature of financial services in the Finnish tort law. Under the
Finnish Tort Liability Act (FI: Vahingonkorvauslaki, 412/1974), the damages may
constitute compensation for economic loss, ie loss not connected to personal
injury or damage to property, only where it has been caused by an act constituting
a criminal offence, by exercise of public authority, or in other cases, where there
are especially weighty reasons (Chapter 5, Section 1).
The general clause of the Customer Protection Act (FI: Kuluttajansuojalaki 38/
1978) complements the special conduct of business regime. The Act provides that
no conduct that is inappropriate or otherwise unfair from the point of view of
consumers shall be allowed in marketing and that the dissemination of false or
misleading information in marketing is prohibited (Chapter 2, Sections 1 and 2).
Moreover, the consumer protection ombudsman’s mandate covers in part the
FSMA’s perimeter.
The Finnish Financial Services Authority (FIN-FSA) plays an important reg-
ulatory role, too, issuing both binding rules, when mandated to do so, and non-
binding recommendations and opinions.
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33 In addition to general damages provision in the Investment Services Act, several other acts
such the FSMA, the Companies Act (osakeyhtiölaki) and the Act on Investment Funds (Sijoitusra-
hastolaki) contain special provisions on damages applicable within their respective scope. Gen-
eral principles of contract and tort law complement, where appropriate, the special damages
provisions of Finnish securitiesmarkets legislation.
34 Government Bill 32/2012, 172.
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3.2 Case Lehman
Background
The case concerned structured bonds, which were issued and guaranteed by
separate Lehman Brothers entities.35 These so-called collateralised debt obliga-
tions (CDO) combined an attractive 5 years maturity and yield with a capital
guarantee, which suggested low risk for the invested amount. The spread of
Lehman’s structured products globally was aided by historically low interest rates
and market volatility.36 The former makes proper yield a rarity in debt markets,
whereas the latter increases the appetite for capital guaranteed products with
longer investment horizon.37 That such an environment is ideal for financial
innovation can be perceived on today’s financial markets, too.38
Lehman’s structured instruments were distributed in Finland via a complex
scheme of banks, brokers and specialized agents. In our case, an investor had
concluded a purchase commitment agreement with an independent dealer acting
as an agent of the defendant bank. A third company had acted as the arranger of
the issue while also taking care of the placements. The defendant nevertheless
acted in close collaboration with the arranger, eg in preparing marketing materi-
als and arranging certain marketing events.
The guarantor of the instruments, Lehman Brothers Holding Inc, filed for the
United States Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 11 reorganization procedure in 15 De-
cember 2008. The issuing entity, Lehman Brothers Treasury Co BV, on the other
hand was declared bankrupt in the Netherlands already in 8 December 2008.
The plaintiff sued the bank for damages for the amount of lost capital (c EUR
500.000), primarily on the basis that the bank was responsible for conveying
false and misleading marketing information, eg on the scope and nature of the
capital guarantee and issuer risk.
554 Heikki Marjosola
35 Structured products can be generally be defined as ‘bonds issued by specialist vehicles and
marketed by the banks which construct them, the return on which is derived from a range of
underlying or embedded assets’Moloney, n 1 above, 405.
36 Moloney, n 1 above, 405.
37 As stated in FSA guidance on structured products: ‘Consumers respond to volatility by seeking
security, but face low yields on traditional savings and investment products. This leads consu-
mers to be attracted by products that claim to offer a degree of security and also promise higher
returns.’ FSA, Finalised guidance Retail Product Development and Governance – Structured
Product Review,March 2012, 3.
38 Nowadays especially pertinent are so-called contigent convertibles (or ʻCoCos’) which are
spreading and finding their way even in the porfolios of non-professional investors.
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The Judgement of the District Court
The District Court gave its judgment on 9 May 2011.39 The plaintiff pleaded that
the defendant had breached the FSMA provisions applicable at the time, which
stated that securities shall not be marketed or acquired in business by giving false
or misleading information or by using procedure that is contrary to good practice
or otherwise unfair. Moreover, the Act provides that the information must be
corrected or supplemented without delay, if it is found to have been misleading
or false after its presentation, and if it may be of material importance to an
investor (FSMA, Chapter 2, Section 1). At the time, the FSMA’s general damages
provision provided that anyone who causes damage through a procedure that is
against the FSMA or against the provisions issued thereunder, shall be liable to
compensate the damage caused (Chapter 9, Section 2).
The plaintiff also invoked the classic general provisions of the Finnish Con-
tracts Act (FCA, 228/1929) claiming that the investment agreement should be held
null and void. That Act provides that under certain circumstances ‘a transaction
into which a person has been fraudulently induced shall not bind him or her’(Sec-
tion 30). Secondly, a transaction shall not be enforceable if it was entered into
under circumstances that would make it ‘incompatible with honour and good
faith’ (Section 33).
In its judgment, the Court gave priority to the following questions: 1) were the
securities marketed by giving false or misleading information to the customer and
2) did the information disclosed influence the investment decision (causality)?
Only in the event of affirmative answers to both questions, the Court would
proceed to assess the claims on validity of the investment contract and the
defendant’s liability for damages.
The Court recognised that the marketing prospectus had stated that the
product was capital guaranteed, and it implicitly provided that the guarantee
protected against market risk. The marketing prospectus did not mention that the
investor was not protected in the event of insolvency of the issuer or guarantor.
Moreover, it provided an implicit guarantee that under normal market conditions
there exists a relatively liquid secondary market where the position could be
liquidated. However, the base prospectus that had been available (in English
only) described risks accurately, including the risk of insolvency of the issuer and
guarantor. Also, in the marketing prospectus it was clearly stated that invest-
ments should not be made without due regard to the bond documentation
provided by Lehman Brother Treasury Co BV as an issuing party.40
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39 Judgement of Pirkanmaa District Court No 1125, 9 May 2011, L 09/24701.
40 Judgement of Pirkanmaa District Court No 1125, 19–20, 22–23.
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Against these findings, the court went on to assess whether the information
provided had been false and misleading. As is customary, the court conducted
both an objective and subjective analysis. The objective analysis relates to the
accuracy and truthfulness of the marketing information, whereas the question of
whether the material was misleading requires a subjective assessment. The court
concluded that the marketing information was partly inaccurate but given the
background of the investor and his investment experience, he should have
exercised a duty of care. For instance, even if the plaintiff had received an oral
confirmation on the absence of risk for the invested capital, he should have
proactively clarified the contradicting information about the product’s risk level,
which was accurately enough depicted elsewhere. As to the claimant’s argument
that he had not understood that the product was in essence a loan to the issuing
Lehman entity, the court interestingly described this fact as only underlining his
duty of care of finding out about the product before making the investment.41
The court found in favour of the Bank. The court admitted that it was possible
that the marketing information, both oral and written, was in part inaccurate and
unclear. But given the plaintiff’s experience and risk profile, the court found that
these contradictions did not materially influence the investment decision.42
Therefore, the court did not need to proceed further to assess the claims on
validity of the contract and liability of the bank.
Judgement of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals gave its judgement in 31 May 201343 adopting an entirely
different line of reasoning and also reaching the opposite conclusion. First of all,
the court addressed the plaintiff’s claims in different order. Where the District
Court did not even proceed to assess some issues, e.g. the question of validity of
the contract, the Court of Appeals started from these fundamental private law
questions. The plaintiff had in fact only concluded the investment commitment
agreement with an independent agent of the defendant. Accordingly, the defen-
dant argued that because no agreement had been made between the parties to the
dispute, the claims on invalidity of the contract were without basis.44 Therefore,
before assessing the claims for damages, the court needed to address the funda-
mental question of the nature of private law relationship between the parties.
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42 Judgement of Pirkanmaa District Court No 1125, 27.
43 Judgement of Turku Court of Appeals No 1125, 31 May 2013, S 11/1410.
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The court noted that the typical cases likely to fall under the general damages
provision of the FSMA do not correspond well with the traditional dichotomy
between contract and tort liabilities. In the view of the Court, such established
private law categories should in general be treated critically in the context of
securities markets damages claims. The Court stressed the importance of privity
of contract as the overarching principle, stating that it should not be abandoned
lightly in favour of more ‘systematic’ assessments.45 But having regarded the fact
that the defendant was in a contractual relationship with both the agent and the
arranger of the securities issue, and de facto collaborated closely with both, the
court interpreted the securities purchase commitment ‘as a legal act that should
be evaluated in light of contract law principles also in the relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant.’46 However, the court also concluded that the
purchase commitment was of such nature that it could not be characterised as a
legal act within the meaning of the general provisions of the Finnish Contracts Act
(FI: Laki varallisuusoikeudellisista oikeustoimista 228/1929). Thus the contract
could not be held void on the basis of mala fide or fraudulent inducement.47
Therefore, the plaintiff could only seek a remedy through and within the special
legal framework set up by the FSMA.
The court then turned to assess the claim that the bonds had been marketed
with false or misleading information, maintaining that this assessment must be
made from the subjective perspective of the individual making the investment
decision. Noting that the investment had been marketed as basically risk-free to
the extent that the nominal value of invested capital was concerned, the court
held that the marketing material had inadequately disclosed the level of risks
involved. The marketing material’s statement about the investor getting back the
capital invested even in the ‘worst case scenario’, was clearly false.48 With regard
to the liability of the defendant, the Court’s reasoned that despite the defendant
had not been in charge of developing the relevant marketing material by explicitly
approving and distributing the marketing material (which also contained the
defendant’s name and logo), the defendant had breached the FSMA’s marketing
provisions and caused damage to the plaintiff.49
Finally, the court assessed the conditions for issuing damages. The District
Court had found that the claimant had himself contributed to the damages
incurred, eg by not exercising sufficient duty of care. The Court of Appeals,
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however, noted that the plaintiff was not a very experienced investor and the size
of the investment (substantially leveraged by borrowed money) was dispropor-
tionate in relation to the plaintiff’s investment history and financial position. The
circumstances had also required making of the investment decision relatively
quickly, forcing the plaintiff to rely on the marketing information that was
misleading and partly false.50
Finally, the resulting damage consisted of the so-called ‘pure economic loss’
which, as noted above, under general Finnish tort law can become subject to
remedy only if particularly compelling reasons require it. The Court nevertheless
held that in the framework of securities markets law such compelling reasons
were not necessary. Furthermore, despite the fact that the court had analysed the
legal relationship between the parties through the lens of contract law principles,
the award of damages could not be perceived as contractual. Interestingly, for the
purposes of liability assessment, the court did not consider the dichotomy
between contract and tort. The general damages clause in the FSMA therefore
only required (a) establishing the breach of the Act’s provisions; (b) ascertaining
the losses caused; and (c) showing that there is a causal connection between the
two.
The Court of Appeal overruled the judgment of the District Court and found
the defendant liable for the loss of capital invested. At the time of writing, the case
is still pending in front of the Supreme Court.
3.3 Case Mermaid
Background
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the so-called ‘mermaid bonds’ became in
Finland the prime example of risky financial instruments that had found their
way into the portfolios of various non-professional retail investors. These struc-
tured bonds, which came in many varieties with different risk levels, were sold by
one prominent Finnish bank to more than 1500 of its customers. The products
were new and fairly complex, involving investors taking both the issuer risk and
credit risk of the companies on whose performance the bonds were referenced to.
Therefore, unlike the Lehman CDOs the mermaid bonds did not have a capital
guarantee. As the financial crisis escalated in 2008, a number of the bond’s
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reference companies became insolvent, and many retail investors lost their in-
vestment entirely.
Judgment of the District Court
The Ahvenanmaa District Court gave its ruling on 29 June 2010. The plaintiff had
invested in a medium-risk variant of the Mermaid bond in 2006. The bond’s value
was highly contingent on defaults of the referenced companies, and even a few
defaults out of one hundred companies was enough to render the product worth-
less. However, in light of a 20-year historical analysis, the risk of significant
defaults was perceived low, and thus the instrument was at least implicitly
marketed as a ‘low risk’ product.
The issuer bank actively solicited the investment and the plaintiff made the
investment in accordance with the bank’s proposal. The plaintiff claimed that he
had understood that the investment’s capital was guaranteed by the issuer bank
and sued the bank for damages on two primary grounds. First, like the plaintiff in
the above Lehman case, he pleaded that the bank had breached the marketing
requirements laid down in the FSMA as applicable at the time of investment
(‘prohibiting marketing of securities by giving false or misleading information or
by using procedure that is contrary to good practice or otherwise unfair’). Sec-
ondly, the plaintiff pleaded that the bank had not fulfilled its obligation under the
FSMA to obtain, prior to the provision of investment service, sufficient informa-
tion on the client (eg financial situation, investment experience and investment
objectives) (Chapter 4, Section 3a).51
The court nevertheless held that the defendant had fulfilled its duty, laid
down in the FSMA in very general terms, to obtain sufficient information on the
client’s investment experience. The court nevertheless noted that the FSMA’s
general clause on marketing of investment products should be considered as well.
The investments (made in 2006) preceded detailed statutory disclosure regula-
tion. However, the recommendation by the Finnish Financial Supervisory Author-
ity (FIN-FSA) stated, inter alia, that the financial intermediary is under obligation
to notify the customer of any exceptional risks relating to the financial instrument
in question.52 The court concluded that the written marketing material was partly
incomplete with regard to disclosure of risks involved, especially considering that
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the product in question was new and complex. Oral representations had not
corrected this deficiency.53
In the court’s reasoning, however, these deficiencies had not materially
influenced the plaintiff’s investment decisions (causality). The plaintiff’s other
investment activities concerning similar financial instruments indicated that he
was willing to speculate. Furthermore, in conducting a subjective assessment the
court held that the claimant, a well-known and successful auditor and long-time
managing director of a medium-size industrial company, had better than average
capabilities to understand the instruments in question. Therefore he had a duty of
care to actively request and acquire clarifying information on the investments.54
Even though the marketing material had been partly misleading and inadequate,
it did not have the required causal connection to the claimant’s investment
activity and the resulting losses. The court held in favour of the defendant.
The dispute was settled soon after the ruling. This is not particularly surpris-
ing given the court’s findings on the shortcomings of the marketing material, as
well as the emphasis on increased disclosure requirements due to the newness
and complexity of the product. Given that there were more than one thousand
investors affected, the bank probably did not want to risk further publicity and a
possible precedent.
3.4 Cases relating to unit-linked insurance plans
In addition to the above Lehman and Mermaid cases, two important decisions by
the Supreme Court of Finland have been issued in relation to so-called unit-linked
insurance plans. Such insurance products became popular in Finland in the
1990s particularly because of their preferential treatment in applicable tax law. In
comparison to structured financial products, unit-linked insurance plans are
somewhat less complex. They differ from traditional life insurance products in
that they entail an investment component and thus also include an investment
risk, ie the risk of losing the invested capital. In short, the value and return of
unit-linked insurance plans are linked to performance of the funds selected by the
insurance takers themselves. The funds can consist of debt or equity instruments.
Both cases dealt with the extent of statutory disclosure obligation of the
insurer in cases where the insured had opted for higher risk equity funds. The
insurance policies were bought in the end of 1990s when neither the applicable
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Finnish Insurance Contract Law (FI: Vakuutussopimuslaki, 543/1994) nor other
regulatory guidance contained special provisions on unit-linked insurance plans.
In the first case the question was whether the plaintiff had been given
misleading or inadequate information on the projected returns and premiums of
the insurance policy.55 The policy in question involved substantial costs mainly
because the insurer collected fees for both the administration of the policy it sold
to the policyholder as well as administration of the underlying funds. In effect,
the client had to pay double administrative fees. The plaintiff pleaded that 1) the
defendant’s marketing material had included misleading and inaccurate informa-
tion and thus breached the disclosure requirements of the applicable Insurance
Contract Law (Section 5, paragraph 1) and that 2) the Court should accordingly
order that the insurance contract is deemed to be valid with its content deter-
mined by the reasonable expectations of the policyholder at the time when the
insurance policy was taken. The latter pleading is based on the explicit remedy
provided by the Insurance Contract Act (Section 9, paragraph 1). That provision
reflects a fundamental principle of Finnish contract and commercial law accord-
ing to which the party to a contract has the right to trust the information
submitted during the negotiations, and such information must be taken into
account when interpreting the contract.56
In its judgment the (majority of the) Supreme Court found the case in favour
of the plaintiff, ruling that the administrative fees of the unit link insurance policy
should be reduced to match what the plaintiff had reason to believe at the time of
concluding the agreement.57 The Supreme Court’s reasoning relied primarily on
traditional contract law principles. In the court’s view, like in Lehman and Mer-
maid cases, the insurer’s disclosure obligation is substantively broader when the
insurance product in question is complex and less well-known.58 However, the
court gave less weight on subjective considerations, applying in its reasoning a
principle similar to the standard of care bonus pater familias (referring to ‘ordin-
ary insurance taker’).
The other Supreme Court case also concerned the adequacy and correctness
of information provided by the insurer, but the question was rather which party
should bear the investment risk and the losses incurred.59 The plaintiff claimed
that the bank should be held liable for the losses caused by the decline in value of
the chosen reference funds, because the risks were not adequately disclosed. The
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57 Judgement by the Supreme Court of Finland No 641 (KKO 2010:25), paragraph 22.
58 Judgement by the Supreme Court of Finland No 641 (KKO 2010:25), paragraph 9.
59 Judgement by the Supreme Court of Finland No 28 (KKO 2011:5), 17 January 2011.
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plaintiff as the policyholder had believed that the capital of the investment was
protected, amongst other things because the product was marketed as a ‘savings
life insurance plan’.60
The Supreme Court held that because of the nature of the unit link insurance
plans, the insurer’s duty of disclosure primarily involves the risks and expected
returns of the funds, which in this case were equity funds with higher than
moderate risk. The insurer therefore had an increased obligation to provide
information on possible, including unfavourable, future scenarios. The court
noted that the offer letter did not contain information on the possible loss of
invested capital and that the return calculation was unusually optimistic, project-
ing 10 per cent returns. Accordingly, the written information provided by the
insurer was insufficient and did not adequately disclose the level of risk in-
volved.61
Nevertheless the Court found in favour of the defendant because a) it held
that the defendant had showed that sufficient information had been given indivi-
dually in private meetings where the investments were discussed and b) because
the plaintiff had broad experience in equity markets and must have understood
the risks involved.62
3.5 Assessment of the cases
At the time the above cases were tried, the MiFID-based rulebook was yet to
emerge. Key provisions of the Finnish Securities Markets Act (FSMA) applicable in
the cases examined date back to 198963 when the first legal rules for Finnish
securities markets were adopted. These rules thus also predate the Investment
Services Directive (93/22/EEC). The same applies to unit-linked insurance pro-
ducts: nowadays the regulation of insurance contracts entails special provisions
on unit-linked insurance plans and other insurance products akin to investments.
In the absence of detailed regulatory guidance, the effectiveness of investor
protection in the cases relied primarily on ex post assessment of flexible private
law concepts and principles such as ‘fairness’ and ‘duty of care’. The cases
demonstrate well how the courts can, and must, fill regulatory voids with relevant
civil law principles. Principles provide flexibility that highly detailed rules lack.
However, the Lehman case also showed especially that traditional commercial
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61 Judgement by the Supreme Court of Finland No 28, paragraphs 15–17.
62 Judgement by the Supreme Court of Finland No 28, paragraphs 17–18.
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principles and concepts are not always easily transferable to the context of
financial markets. The fact that regulation of investment services and securities
markets is becoming more detached from classic private law constructs is particu-
larly true for the traditional separation in civil law between tort and contract
based damages, and for the assessment of the validity of contracts. The special
nature of damages claims on financial markets has now been expressly recog-
nized in Finnish law (see above). Finally, as the Lehman case well depicted,
intermediated financial markets with high-degree of specialisation can make
discerning the relevant private law relationships, and their legal evaluation,
cumbersome.
In the absence of a strict, the MiFID-based client classification regime, in the
majority of the cases the court relied on highly subjective ex post assessments of
the plaintiffs’ experience and background.64 In the examined cases the courts
considered it relevant that the financial instruments or insurance products mar-
keted and sold were relatively new. This emphasized the banks’ duty of care in
disclosing material investor information in their marketing material as well as in
private negotiations with the clients. The Court of Appeals in Lehman also held
that this fact should be taken into account in considering the circumstances under
which the investment decision was made. Indeed, such ex post applications do
not fall far from the regulatory regime in force today.65
The next section will ask what role national courts could, and should, have in
the future disputes between investment firms and their clients, given that their
private law relationship is embedded in an increasingly self-sufficient EU rule-
book. Will there be room for principles deriving for national private law and if so,
should these principles allow the courts to go beyond the maximum harmonisa-
tion regime of the MiFID, which explicitly targets minimising Member States’
discretion across Union financial services law?66 Finally, could the courts take a
more active role in interpreting principles deriving from the MiFID itself?
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art 24(4) regarding appropriate information to be provided to clients. In determining what
constitutes the provision of information ‘in good time’, an investment firm should have regard to
the urgency of the situation and take into account the client’s need for sufficient time to read and
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information when dealing with a complex or unfamiliar product or service. See MiFID II, Rec 83.
66 MiFID II, Rec 58.
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4 What role for courts in investment
firm-client disputes?
4.1 Regulation by litigation?
It has been argued that the landscape of securities law enforcement in Europe is
transforming. After the MiFID, it was anticipated that the Courts would be ‘rele-
gated to the sidelines’ in shaping the legal framework for the provision of invest-
ment services,67 but more recently, it has been argued that detailed mandatory
requirements in the area of EU securities law – something that few Member States
had prior to EU intervention – provide a clearer legal basis for investor claims,
and thus the EU regime for securities and investment services is developing
towards ‘regulation by litigation’.68 This would bring the EU closer to a United
States style ‘adversarial, judicialised approach to enforcement with an increasing
emphasis on private enforcement’.69
There is no doubt that few corners of financial services and markets have
remained untouched by EU regulation since the ‘seismic shift’ brought about by
the MiFID.70 The MiFID II and MiFIR introduced fundamental reorientations in
regulatory style and shifted more weight to effective supervision and enforcement
(see above), but the updated regime is unlikely to bring major changes to the
nature of private law rights underlying the investment firm–client relationship or
related liability mechanisms.71 Therefore, the fate of private enforcement, and for
that matter the eurolegalism thesis to the extent it concerns investment services,
will continue to be at least partly contingent on specific national circumstances.
Two observations from Finland will suffice here.
First, the system of private enforcement in Finland is heavily dominated by
the alternative dispute resolution service of the Finnish Financial Ombudsman.
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67 Peter O Mülbert, ʻThe Eclipse of Contract Law in the Investment Firm-Client-Relationship: The
Impact of the MiFID on the Law of Contract from a German Perspective’, in G. Ferrarini and
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68 R.D. Kelemen, Eurolegalism: The transformation of law and regulation in the European Union
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69 Kelemen, n 68 above, 96.
70 See N. Moloney, EC Securities Regulation (2ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)
356–357. For a concise assessment of the ‘revolutionary’ impact of the MiFID on especially market
structure, see J.-P. Casey, and K. Lannoo, The MiFID Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2009) 6–25.
71 As anticipated byMoloney, n 5 above, 419.
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The Securities Complaints Board provides an informal and highly popular alter-
native dispute resolution scheme. The Board arguably lowers the threshold for
customers to seek remedies. Between 2002 and 2012, the Board handled in total
283 cases. In 20 per cent of the cases the Board recommended compensation for
the complainant.72 The Board received over 150 complaints relating to Mermaid
bonds alone, which put significant strain on its resources. Out of this, more than
one hundred were settled.73 For the rest, the Board’s non-binding recommenda-
tions proved effective: the bank followed each of them and none of the customers
continued to court.74 Looking at the scarce Finnish case law dealing with mis-
conduct of financial firms and related damages claims, it seems to hold true also
for Finland that ‘the role of the courts has been marginalised by the dominance of
the Financial Ombudsman in adjudication in the retail sector.’75 The EU legislator
is unlikely to object to this development, given that setting up of out-of-the-court
dispute settlement procedures is explicitly required in the MiFID.76
Secondly, Finnish consumer protection in general, and investor protection in
particular, lacks a culture of effective collective redress.77 The Finnish Class
Action Act (444/2007) did finally introduce in Finland a collective enforcement
mechanism, but the regime has been subject to critique. The Act applies only
within the limits of the competence of the Consumer Ombudsman who also acts
as a gatekeeper, by having exclusive standing to bring a class action. With regard
to investment services, the Class Action Act specifically carves out civil cases that
concern the conduct of an issuer of securities (Section 1) but the procedure could
be applied to civil cases concerning eg alleged misselling of financial instruments
or unit linked insurance plans.78 To this date, not a single class action case has
been brought to court.
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for the Securities Complaint Board as out of 14 cases it handled the Board did not issue one
opinion finding compensation appropriate.
73 Finnish Financial Ombudman’s Service, unpublished presentation, 20 March 2012 (on file
with the author).
74 Finnish Financial Ombudman’s Service, unpublished presentation, 20 March 2012 (on file
with the author).
75 I. MacNeil, ‘Editorial’ (2013) 7 Law and Financial Markets Review 135.
76 SeeMiFID, art 53 andMiFID II art 75.
77 In Sweden a class action case involving more than two hundred retail investors was raised
against a bank that allegedly missold similar Lehman bonds than in Finland. See ’HD ska pröva
frågan om grovt rättegångsfel vid grupptalan mot kapitalförvaltare’, Dagens Juridik, 8 April 2014,
http://www.dagensjuridik.se/2014/.
78 Government Bill HE 154/2006, 33.
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4.2 Courts and more formalized investor protection
Extensive EU regulation of financial services represents well the character of
European regulatory private law as a self-sufficient legal order that is distinguish-
able from national private legal orders.79 The effectiveness of the EU investor
protection regime therefore depends not only on how it interacts with national
systems of enforcement, but also on how it will interact with the plurality of
national private legal orders.
The cases above demonstrated well how the Courts filled regulatory gaps with
materially oriented private law concepts and principles. An important question
thus is, whether a more detailed investor protection regime laid down by EU rules
will actually make such material private law assessments redundant, replacing
them with a more formalized compliance regime – in a way bringing the logic of
supervisory law into the realm of private law.80 Formalization of the law on
investment services is naturally connected to the way the law is enforced.
Wymeersch’s following comment from 1997 summarizes well also the situation
today:
‘The EC directives dealing with securities matters are mainly a matter of administrative
oversight. Although they reflect on private law relations, their first purpose is not to deal
with relations among investors, but with the organization, oversight and, to a lesser extent,
enforcement of the rules governing securities markets and transactions. This feature directly
affects remedies: these have been conceived more in terms of administrative action, or by
imposing penal sanctions, than by way of allowing enforcement through means of private
law.’81
The Finnish law on the provision of investment services continues to state clearly
that whoever breaches the Act’s rules will be liable for the damage caused; but
should this also mean that to be compliant means to be safe from private law
claims?82 It is here where European regulatory private law, the form, procedure
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79 On self-sufficiency of EU regulatory private law, see H.-W. Micklitz, ‘A self-Sufficient Eur-
opean Private Law – A viable Concept’, in H.-W. Micklitz and Y. Svetiev (eds), A self-Sufficient
European Private Law – A viable Concept, EUI Working Papers LAW 2012/31, European Regulatory
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80 Cherednychenko, while acknowledging that such clashes are possible, also notes that the
tension between these different logics are mitigated by the ‘radiating effect of supervision
standards on private law’. Cherednychenko, n 15 above, 944–945.
81 Wymeersch, n 13 above, 204.
82 As noted by Cherednychenko (n 15 above, 933), ‘the adoption of a comprehensive regulatory
framework for investment services may give an impression that it contains all substantive rules
that investment firms must comply with when providing their services to (potential) clients and
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and content of which becomes from its instrumentalisation for building and
shaping markets,83 is at risk of exhuming the less formal aspects of national
private law.84 This risk could be especially acute in private law regimes such as
Finland’s, where contract law traditionally distinguishes between material and
formal (or procedural) regulation.85 The purpose of material regulation is to
favour the weaker party, eg by giving him or her ‘an advantage concerning the
contents of the contract, and taking into account the requirements of an “ideal”
contract balance and a solidarity duty of the stronger party towards the weaker.’86
There are examples of such tensions between specialised financial regulation and
principles-based private law. In the UK, recent case law has dealt with the
question of whether common law duties and remedies could complement the
perceived shortcomings in the highly detailed statutory investor protection re-
gime.87 Lord Hodge in the case Grant Estates Ltd (In Liquidation) v The Royal Bank
of Scotland adopted an approach based on a clear separation between these two
domains:
‘Looking to the policy of the FSMA one discovers that it provides protection to consumers of
financial services through a self-contained regulatory code and statutory remedies for
breach of its rules. As I have said, it needs no fortification by the parallel creation of common
law duties and remedies.’88
Advocates for such systematic separation between national private law regimes
and EU regulatory code can be found from academy as well. The ‘separation’
prescription can be based on at least two basic arguments. First, because the
MiFID provides a well-developed and sophisticated investor protection system,
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and specific private law duties should be observed as well).
83 Micklitz, n 79 above, 16.
84 This risk is described by Svetiev in the following way: ‘If indeed EU interventions, now also
intruding deeply into horizontal private relationships, have a narrow mandate and a specific
rationality and if such a rationality is now ensnaring national actors and institutions, this can
have particularly deleterious consequences as it extinguishes the tools for the pursuit of a
diversity of public policy objectives at the altar of liberalisation.’ Y. Svetiev, ‘Dimensions of Self-
Sufficiency’, EUIWorking Paper, European Regulatory Private Law Project (ERC-ERPL – 05), LAW
2013/05, 3.
85 See eg M. Rudanko, ‘Is there Scope for the Protection of the Weaker on Financial Markets?’
Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i Finland JFT, 3–4/2009, 532–544, 544.
86 M. Rudanko, ‘Is there Scope for the Protection of the Weaker on Financial Markets?’ JFT 3–4/
2009, 532–544, 544.
87 MacNeil, n 75 above, 135–137.
88 Judgement of the Court of Session of Scotland, Grant Estates Ltd (In Liquidation) v The Royal
Bank of Scotland, 21 August 2012, paragraph 79.
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the risk that the application of its ex ante rules would lead to unacceptable ex post
solutions seems theoretical. Second, the general need for legal certainty argument
speaks against unpredictable application of national private law principles which
would add to already demanding MiFID duties.89 On the other hand, the opposite
argument against such strict separation holds that national private law provides
an important safeguard, because despite many private law duties of care are
represented in MiFID, not all of them are included.90
It would be an unnecessary bet to trust that the MiFID’s self-sufficiency
seeking conduct of business rules now provide an answer to every imaginable
legal problem that can arise between investment firms and their clients. But
rather than having each court digging into their intrinsic private law doctrines for
answers, as a middle way approach we should concentrate first on the principles
laid down in the MiFID itself –many of which actually have their basis in national
private law frameworks.91 Let us take the principle of duty of care (or loyalty
principle) as an example. The duty to act honestly, fairly and professionally in the
best interests of clients was already laid down in the ISD. This principle is
different from many other conduct of business requirements, in that its applica-
tion is not dependent on the MiFID’s client classification system, but it has an
overarching function applying to the relationship with any client. The same
applies to the general obligation to be fair, clear and not misleading.92 These
principles indeed give further latitude to national courts,93 but unfortunately they
are useful only to a certain point. Given that such directive-based principles
unavoidably lack direct effect, national courts must in any case take recourse to
national law.
One can also ask why principles-based enforcement via courts is necessary in
the first place? A pessimistic view is that there is a real risk that once fully
operationalized in the everyday interaction between investment firms and their
customers, EU investor/consumer protection regime can install a system that is
more effective in terms of formal compliance than substantive, material investor
protection. A carefully operationalized ‘tick the box’ compliance regime could,
while emphasising informed choice and disclosure, reinforce the principle of
caveat emptor rather than advance substantive protection of vulnerable investors.
Therefore, the EU’s investor protection regime, largely representing what has
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89 Busch, n 7 above, 395–396.
90 Cherednychenko, n 15 above, 935–936.
91 See Cherednychenko, n 15 above, 931–932.
92 This is underlined inMiFID II, Rec 86.
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‘sufficient latitude to render justice in individual cases.’ Busch, n 7 above, 396.
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been called administrative paradigm,94 should not foreclose more general princi-
ples-based enforcement action through civil courts. These two enforcement di-
mensions represent different paradigms of securities regulation and they should
not only compete, but also coexist.95 More intrusive administrative intervention to
the private law relationship between investment firms and their clients, as en-
visaged by the updated MiFID regime, may make the administrative paradigm
more complete but it does not make the private law dimension redundant. In the
EU, however, the tension between the two competing paradigms has its own
dynamics, as the administrative, rule-based paradigm is being more forcefully
imposed from above as a supranational legal order, while principles-based en-
forcement action continues to stem from the plurality of national private law
systems.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that out-of-the-court dispute settlement
procedures can offer great help in checking compliance with the expanding
investment services rulebook, and offer a more approachable, cheap and effective
redress procedure. But bodies of that nature fall short of the authority vested in
courts and may risk turning the process of adjudication into a managerial ex-
ercise. Compared to courts, most extra-judicial dispute resolution schemes must
also cope with certain important procedural shortcomings. For instance, the
Finnish Securities Complaints Board must rely solely on written evidence and it
lacks procedural powers to gain essential evidence. Accordingly, closer attention
should be paid to the procedural limits of such out-of-the courts dispute resolu-
tions schemes.96
5 Concluding remarks
This paper tackles the broad issue of what role national civil courts should play in
the enforcement of the EU’s intensifying investor protection rulebook. A majority
of European investors harmed in the 2007–2008 crisis were not protected by the
MiFID regime and therefore the next crisis will probably be different. However,
the Finnish cases examined demonstrate how the courts can fill regulatory gaps
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with material civil law principles. Principles provide flexibility, which highly
detailed rules lack. The EU’s investor protection regime, on the other hand, is
representative of the administrative paradigm, which relies on an increasingly
detailed rulebook and, after the MiFID II/MiFIR, more interventionist style of
supervision and enforcement. This tendency is at risk of foreclosing more princi-
ples-based enforcement action via national courts, where national private law not
only fills regulatory gaps, but also embodies the principles vested in the MiFID
regime. Lastly, it should be emphasized that rather than advocating a principles-
based enforcement system as a superior enforcement model over a more predict-
able and rules-based administrative paradigm, this paper tries to argue for their
co-existence as complementary systems of enforcement. Investors will benefit if
more effective ex ante rules protect them against taking unplanned, unwanted
and even unsuitable risks in the first place.
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